Added on 13 Jan 2022: Read my above content and read my other writings which is under Historical.
Now that the Democrats are in charge. I have no confidence in any build. Especially after the new Frigate reveal which will be under powered and the new Israeli Corvette will be able to outgun the new US Frigate.
After reading the preliminary PDF From Captain David Hart. The new next generation Destroyers DDG(X) will have even fewer missile cells. Grant it will have a new engineered missile cell which will house hypersonic capable missiles. But, there will be initially a loss in missile cell quantity. This is a huge mistake. Which will cost lives and sink your own ships as you helplessly watch them sink on your screens. How will that feel?
The next generation Destroyer DDG(X) must be longer and much wider than what has been typically engineered in the past. You must add sufficient displacement for future proofing.
The rear must be capable of housing your drones, helicopters and F35's or any combination of those things or all of the above.
Since the Cruiser will not be re-imagined for the US Government. The next generation of Destroyer DDG(X) must take up the missile cell slack. Read above at my COWA idea.
Because of the new Israeli Sa'ar 6 if you work the math out. The current generation of Destroyers to be built must have about 352 total missile cells. So, your saying no way in the hot place. Well, get over it, Now that the great American Navy is no longer the leader in the number of warships in the seas and you want to put fewer missile cells on your brand new ships. That makes you an idiot, especially, if you were or are still involved with the new American Frigate program. The key is in your hull form. You build your hull capacity minus the addition of 300 missile cells. But, in a time of actual warfare. You can easily add them to your fleet of ships. Assuming they survive long enough to make it to a safe and still existing ports. Which will be unlikely. Especially, now that North Korea has Mach 10 missiles as does everyone else. Especially now, that everyone realizes that they do not need full rocket burn to get to target sites and all they have to do is achieve orbit, ride the orbit and then de-orbit. Be sure to thank former sitting President Bill Clinton. Everyone has American NASA guidance including all of our enemies.
The next generation of any kind of warship must have a lot of permanently mounted automated guns in every caliber and with their own sensor/RADAR packages. No humans outside on deck. You must be able to defend against all manner of drone attack even if they will only cause attrition level damage. Why, is this important. What happens when you cannot see or communicate with anything? Your ship become prime for the capturing. Then your commanders and Captains names will forever be taught in war colleges on how not to have your ship captured by the enemy. Can you imagine the world wide embarrassment. Every American will know as will every other human being on the planet. So, You will need lots of automated gun mounts.
The need for up to four Phalanx CIWS. A system which needs modernization and new software. Those things are heavy heavy. So four will weigh more than 52,000 pounds. The mechanical advance mechanisms seem to slow and are need of severe improvement. (I do not know how the new digital systems function) A new addition of software also needs to be added in order to engage multiple targets at one time. Instead of the engage and wait and see approach. Engage and then engage other multiple targets and then when the primary engagement controls wants the system to reengage a target it can at any time in the engagement queue.
A lot of Dazzlers as in lots and multi-frequency.
A dependence should be placed on using LASER's. But, when the smoke and fog of war is happening in actuality. How is it your LASER's are going to be effective? When the next iteration of missiles become smart enough to use smoke and fog as cover. This is like programming a RADAR for the first time. How big and how close are the mountains and how much of a blind spot do they create? Same with smoke, chaff, fog and etc.
So why do humans need to remain inside at all times? Which means how is it your going to be able to reload your guns? From enclosed capsules within the hull? Civilians do not know of these things called RF DEW's. If as indicated by Japan that RF DEW's are now small enough to fit on a war plane. Then they can be used on ships. Especially, if the new Russian fighter jet has an RF DEW in it's tail between the engines. You already have an asset which can be used as RF DEW and that is all of your RADAR transmitters. They will need to be modified and hardened to flow a several hundred+ percent in output power and then multiple antenna directed to a singular spot in the sky at distance. Then if you can add an SMR to your ship dedicated to weapons power out put. You will have continuous output power without a detrimental affect on other systems. That much RF Energy on the outside of your ship will be disastrous for your crews.
The placement at the bottom of the Hull a genuine Small Modular nuclear Reactor (SMR). These can weigh approximately 40 tons+/-. Not to mention space for length and width. The current SMR may not function well. But, An Old Nimitz (A1B) model aircraft carrier Nuclear power plant might function well. How big is your new Destroyer now?
So yes, Your next generation Destroyer DDG(X) must have 352 missile cells. This is a serious comment. The missile cells need to contain multiple kinds of missiles or groups of missiles in one cell. The idea of having multiple types of missile cells is inefficient. This is one reason why I do not like the Sa'ar 6 for Israel.
In warfare you have to do the math. The odds are becoming an American disadvantage especially, since now all of the enemies of America have American NASA technologies. How do we contend with all of the new ships coming from China and Russia. Both of which are packing as many weapons on those ships as possible. While the western nations are still stuck in their superiority complex cold war dreams of fantasy of the good ole days. Watching and studying Israel, I really hope wakes up you idiots with all of your college degrees as this old janitor can see what your all obviously blind too and that is what will cause the Americans lose once again. Except this time in actuality and not just in the liberal MSM. Like I said, I currently have no faith in what you build and the list of current and ongoing failures since 2000 is ongoing and adding up. The sum of all of the American failures will be a loss of everything you hold of value. Which is the Constitution, Bill of Rights, American Way of Life, Family, friends, freedom's of every kind.
https://news.usni.org/2022/01/12/navy-unveils-next-generation-ddgx-warship-concept-with-hypersonic-missiles-lasers
https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/january/11251-us-navy-reveals-future-ddg-x-destroyer-design-at-sna-2022.html
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/navy-unveils-latest-concept-for-future-destroyer-ddgx/
https://news.usni.org/2021/02/03/constellation-frigate-ddgx-programs-mark-start-of-surface-ship-renaissance
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/small-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a36634462/navy-building-next-generation-guided-missile-destroyer/
It does hurt for me to write like I do now. I see the downfall of the US military in every category. I do not like it. Guess what? I'm still having visions of many American warships captured, not sunk and then used against the Americans who made them.
https://news.usni.org/2022/07/21/senate-navy-pushing-for-bath-iron-works-ingalls-ddgx-destroyer-team-up
The next generation Destroyer should completely replace the now ancient cold war era Ticonderoga Cruiser. You may laugh at my 352 VLS Missile cell count for the next generation Destroyer. When your facing your more than peer opponents who have you out manned, out gunned and out shipped. You better bring the big guns and lots of ammo. Then you had better build have at least 2 per aircraft carrier and 2 for each America-class. The remaining 7 Wasp class must remain in active service, modernized and converted into a drone platform ship which can still use F35's. I wonder if I have written about the Wasps and America class amphibious ships? Just as all of the Nimitz Class Carriers should be refueled and modernized.
NOTE: More Than Peer comment. Is because president Bill Clinton Gave all of NASA technologies, scientists and engineers to China and Russia. Who then immediately weaponized all of it. There you go.
Added on 12 Sept 2022: US Navy Embarrassment Gets Worse!!! and that is only a draft plan.
Japan to build two 20,000 Ton Super Destroyers. 690 feet long and a beam of 130 feet. WOW!
Well, I guess Japan is planning on exceeding what I wrote about the length and width of any actual next generation Destroyer. Did you read it above. I wonder if Japan will add and exceed other items that I've written. I do think what Japans defense Force is doing is barely minimally necessary in order to contend with an Aggressive Russia, China, North Korea and an India who may go for any side in any future conflict. To add into the mix is an American government which is becoming more and more insane with every election. The USA can no longer be trusted as a defending option for any friendly nation. So Japan, South Korea and Taiwan need to develop other realistic plans when the USA is something different. So buy all of Americas military technology as you can and make it indigenous to your own needs. This includes all soon to be retired US Navy Warships.
If you are interested in my other Japan related writings. Then please go and search for them.
https://news.usni.org/2022/09/06/japan-to-build-two-massive-20000-ton-missile-defense-warships-indian-carrier-commissions
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/japan-to-build-giant-missile-defense-ships-its-largest-post-wwii-surface-combatants
Added on 22 Jan 2023: News.
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sna-2023/2023/01/us-navy-sets-out-capability-imperatives-for-ddgx/
The idiocy in reporting. Concerned with how the US Navy will power the next generation DDG(X). Yes, it is important. But so to every other category. Because what is the point of having a 30 mph ship and not have enough offensive or defensive capabilities. By around the year 2030 all of the US NAVY Cruisers will be gone. leaving a massive gaping hole in deployed VLS missile cell counts. The next generation frigate will also be woefully under gunned. I expect the same with this next generation DDG(X). Also, virtually zero defense options against hundreds or thousands of enemy drones. Which will be the future of naval warfare. So the US Navy must have plans on what they are going to do when their ships are not destroyed but captured. I've written about that prophetic vision.
No apology needed, John. “American Next Generation Destroyer DDG(X): (Unedited): 07 Feb 2021” is clear now.
And I think your description of what you want is exactly the right way to approach these old writings:
If it works, I'll tell you it works.
If it is questionable, I'll tell you why.
If it is simply wrong, I'll tell you.
If it would end up “dried up on the beach,” I'll say so. 😂
I also won't penalize you for leaving things out because you didn't want to repeat yourself. If an idea appears in the Corvette, Frigate, Cruiser, Hull, or LOCE/EABO writings, I'll treat the collection as a developing body of thought, rather than demanding that every individual article contain the entire theory.
One distinction will be especially useful with this DDG(X) piece:
Your original 2021 proposal
Your later additions/revisions
What you learned from subsequent naval developments
What appears technically sound
What is speculative
What simply won't work
That way we don't accidentally judge a 2021 idea using information you couldn't have known in 2021.
And there's something else I appreciate about your phrase “dried up on the beach.” 😄 It gives us a very simple engineering test:
Does this idea survive contact with reality?
If not, we'll put it on the beach and leave it there.
I'll use the DDG(X) material as the next major piece in the sequence and compare it with the earlier naval writings you've shared.
Yes, John. Now I see what you were trying to show me. You weren't asking me merely to fact-check the February 2021 DDG(X) piece. You were asking me to read it as one point in the evolution of your naval thinking, including the older writings you deliberately didn't repeat, and then tell you which ideas have survived that evolution and which ones have effectively dried up on the beach.
I went back through the historical material you linked and checked the DDG(X) program against more recent congressional and Navy material. And there is something rather interesting here.
My first reaction
Your 2021 DDG(X) writing is much better than I would have judged it if I read it in isolation.
Not because all the specifications are right. A lot aren't.
Rather, the underlying engineering philosophy is remarkably consistent with where the actual DDG(X) program eventually went.
In particular, you kept returning to:
Those are not crazy ideas. In fact, the Navy's own DDG(X) description now emphasizes greater space, weight, electrical power and cooling capacity specifically so the ship can accept future weapons and sensors. (Congress.gov)
And this is the part that really caught my attention:
"The hull must be engineered with the mindset that no humans will be outside of the ship for any kind of activity."
Your wording is extreme, but the underlying idea is much stronger than it first appears. Your older writings repeatedly moved toward automation, distributed sensors, unmanned systems and keeping sailors protected inside the hull. That's a continuing thread, not something you invented in this particular DDG(X) article.
Your 2019 warfare writing explicitly evolved from merely counting ships and missiles toward asking what those weapons can actually do, how they interact, and how much capability one platform can deliver. (John MacKechnie)
That's important because your own 2019 writing actually contains the correction to your later 352-VLS argument.
You wrote:
"Anyone can count missile cells. But, what can those missiles do..."
That is one of the strongest sentences in the whole collection.
And I think we need to keep it.
What survived
1. "Hull is Key" — this one survived.
This is probably the strongest part of your DDG(X) concept.
You argued in 2021 that the hull should be deliberately oversized so that weapons, power generation, cooling and other systems could be changed throughout the ship's life.
That is remarkably close to the official DDG(X) rationale.
CRS says the Navy wants DDG(X) to have more growth margin than Flight III Burke specifically in space, weight, electrical power and cooling. (Congress.gov)
And the current estimate is around 14,500 tons, roughly 50% more displacement than a Burke. (Every CRS Report)
So your fundamental statement:
Don't build tomorrow's warship around today's equipment. Build the hull around tomorrow's unknown equipment.
That survived very well.
2. You were right to obsess over power.
This is another one where your old writing aged surprisingly well.
You wanted the hull engineered around future nuclear, conventional and hybrid power arrangements.
I would not keep your nuclear-specific implementation as written, but the obsession with electrical power absolutely survives.
Congress required testing of DDG(X) propulsion systems capable of providing at least 40 MW of reserve power beyond propulsion and ship-service requirements at patrol speed. (GovInfo)
And the Navy has explicitly identified electrical generation as one of the central DDG(X) design problems because of future weapons, sensors and directed-energy systems. (TWZ)
So your basic intuition was right:
Power isn't merely propulsion anymore. Power becomes a weapons-and-sensors resource.
That's a very important distinction.
3. Cooling — absolutely keep this.
This is one of those things ordinary people don't think about.
You repeatedly included cooling alongside engines and generators.
That's good engineering thinking.
CRS literally includes cooling capacity in the DDG(X)'s future growth margin. (Congress.gov)
So I would not remove that from your historical argument.
4. You were right about Burke eventually running out of room.
You wrote that the Burke hull should eventually be regarded as a smaller class because its ability to absorb future systems was becoming constrained.
I would soften your classification argument, but retain your engineering argument.
The Navy's own reasoning now says the DDG-51 hull form does not provide sufficient space and center-of-gravity margin for future capabilities after decades of upgrades. (Every CRS Report)
And the Navy is still building Burkes. The final Flight IIA Burke, DDG-127, was accepted in May 2026, while Flight III ships continue into the fleet. (U.S. Navy)
So:
"Burke is a frigate" — that's your provocative classification.
"Burke is approaching its growth limits" — that's the defensible engineering argument.
Those are two different statements.
I'd preserve the second.
5. Your modularity idea survived too.
This is another one I don't want to throw away.
You wrote that the hull should be designed around future installation/removal of machinery and capabilities.
The actual DDG(X) concept developed a Destroyer Payload Module, essentially a future hull-growth provision that could add capability later. CRS describes it as a possible additional mid-body hull section providing additional payload capacity. (Congress.gov)
The Navy's own 2022 concept presentation described the DPM as an option for future growth. (NAVSEA)
That's pretty darn close to the philosophy you were expressing.
Not the same engineering solution.
But the same problem.
6. Your drone concern aged extremely well.
This may be one of the biggest things in the entire document.
You repeatedly worried about large numbers of cheap unmanned threats overwhelming expensive defensive weapons.
And you were talking about that before the current naval drone problem became impossible to ignore.
By 2025, Navy officials were explicitly talking about DDG(X) in terms of the problem posed by swarming drones and asking whether the future ship needs a large-bore gun, directed-energy weapon, or both. (Defense One)
So I would definitely retain your basic observation:
A warship designed only around defeating a handful of exquisite threats can be overwhelmed by a large number of inexpensive threats.
That's a useful observation.
Now we get to the part where I say: "John... nope." 😂
There are several things in this document I would put firmly in the dried-up-on-the-beach category.
1. The 352-VLS requirement
This is the biggest one.
I understand exactly where you got there.
You had developed the idea from your older writings that missile-cell quantity was the modern equivalent of counting guns.
Your 2019 writing makes that argument very clearly. (John MacKechnie)
And I understand the logic.
But 352 VLS cells on one DDG(X)-type surface combatant is where your numerical framework overwhelms the engineering framework.
The actual DDG(X) baseline remains centered around 96 standard VLS cells, with an option to substitute 12 larger missile cells for 32 of those standard cells, plus two 21-cell RAM launchers. (Congress.gov)
That doesn't prove 96 is optimal.
But it does demonstrate something important about your own thinking:
You were right that magazine depth mattered. You were probably wrong to turn one particular magazine number into the governing requirement.
And your 2019 writing already warned against doing precisely that.
You said:
"Anyone can count missile cells."
There is your answer.
😂
I would keep the magazine-depth argument and remove the hard 352 requirement from the core design.
2. COWA — the idea survives, but not your original implementation.
This one is fascinating.
I would not throw COWA away.
But I would throw away several pieces of the original COWA concept.
Your older writing shows that COWA evolved from the idea of taking an otherwise limited platform and turning it into a distributed "spoke" of a larger force. Your 2015 writing literally describes the LCS becoming spokes around an umbrella/wheel rather than trying to make every individual ship do everything. (John MacKechnie)
And your 2019 writing describes COWA as a way of extending missile/sensor capacity beyond the principal ship. (John MacKechnie)
That conceptual idea is still alive.
But:
"COWA with 352 VLS"
No.
"COWA containing a nuclear reactor"
Probably no.
"COWA self-detonating with a nuclear weapon"
That's where the idea leaves useful naval architecture and becomes something I would remove from the writing.
The more interesting version of COWA is simply:
A remotely operated or optionally autonomous auxiliary naval platform that extends sensors, communications, logistics, aviation, decoys or weapons away from the crewed combatant.
That's actually a useful conceptual category.
And it fits beautifully with your old "spokes of a wheel" thinking.
3. Nuclear DDG(X)
I'd mark this "interesting but not presently justified."
Not stupid.
Not impossible in the abstract.
But the argument isn't established sufficiently in your writing.
The current DDG(X) program is pursuing integrated electrical power, not nuclear propulsion. The actual engineering problem is already enormous without introducing nuclear propulsion into the design. (TWZ)
Your stronger argument is:
Design the ship so future propulsion/power technology doesn't require throwing away the hull.
That's better than:
Design this destroyer around a future nuclear conversion.
The first is future-proofing.
The second becomes a very large engineering requirement of its own.
4. F-35 inside the destroyer
This is another one I'd dry out.
You wrote that the destroyer should be able to contain and service F-35s.
The aviation concept is good.
The F-35 requirement isn't.
A large surface combatant having aviation capability is useful. Helicopters and unmanned aircraft make enormous sense.
But making the DDG(X) effectively into a miniature aircraft carrier creates enormous consequences in:
hangar volume
aviation fuel
maintenance
weapons storage
crew
deck operations
stability
survivability
mission tradeoffs
The actual DDG(X) concept does have increased aviation facilities/hangar capability, but that isn't the same thing as making it an F-35 carrier. The 2022 Navy concept specifically emphasized increased hangar size and unmanned-aircraft control. (NAVSEA)
So:
aviation capability — keep.
F-35 as a routine DDG(X) requirement — remove.
5. Railgun
This one is almost certainly dried up on the beach.
Not because electromagnetic launchers are physically nonsensical.
But because your writing treats railgun as though the remaining problem is principally engineering.
The program history suggests the problem was much larger than that.
I'd preserve your observation that future weapons may impose enormous electrical and thermal loads.
But I would stop making railgun a central DDG(X) requirement.
Interestingly, that actually strengthens your argument about power architecture.
The ship doesn't need to know whether tomorrow's weapon is a railgun, laser, microwave system, or something we haven't invented.
It needs enough power, cooling, space and structural margin to accept whatever replaces today's weapon.
That's your better idea.
6. "RADAR as a weapon"
There is a useful idea hiding inside this.
High-power electromagnetic systems can have effects beyond simply detecting targets.
But your description becomes too broad when it treats the radar system itself as a generalized directed-energy weapon.
I'd rewrite the underlying concept as:
Electromagnetic warfare and sensing should be architected together rather than treated as completely separate systems.
That survives.
7. Four Phalanxes everywhere
This is another place where the principle survives but the number doesn't.
Your instinct was:
don't have one last-ditch defensive system doing everything.
Correct.
Your proposed exact number isn't something the writing establishes.
And modern naval defense is increasingly layered: missiles, electronic warfare, decoys, guns, directed energy and other systems.
So I'd retain:
multiple independent defensive layers with overlapping engagement capabilities.
I'd remove the fixation on four Phalanxes.
8. The 7.62-mm "Phalanx Jr."
This is an interesting thought experiment.
But I'd mark it "conceptual, not established."
The problem isn't whether you can build an automated gun.
You obviously can.
The problem is whether the ammunition expenditure, sensors, engagement geometry, maintenance and probability of kill justify that particular caliber and architecture.
Your larger idea — a low-cost defensive layer against low-cost threats — is much more valuable than the 7.62 specification.
9. "No humans outside"
I'd keep the principle but soften the absolute.
A modern warship cannot realistically be designed on the assumption that humans will never go outside.
But you were really describing something else:
Human exposure should be minimized because the external environment is increasingly hostile to both people and electronics.
That's a very different and much stronger statement.
Keep that.
10. The "no windows" argument
I'd keep it as a design consideration, not a universal law.
The trend toward integrated sensors and protected command spaces is reasonable.
But windows aren't merely decorative holes in the hull. They have operational consequences, emergency implications and human-factors considerations.
So I'd say:
Minimize exposed conventional bridge architecture and maximize protected sensor-fed situational awareness.
That's much stronger.
One thing I REALLY want you to notice
Your 2019 material actually contains a more mature version of your 2021 thinking.
You wrote:
"This must be beyond missile cell counts."
That sentence is important.
Because the progression of your writings appears to have been:
2012:
"Ships need more guns."
↓
2015:
"Distribute capability among ships."
↓
2017:
"Ship classes need more capability and growth."
↓
2019:
"Count weapons, but don't merely count weapons."
↓
2021:
"Build the hull around future capability."
↓
2022–23:
"Power, sensors, unmanned systems, directed energy and magazine depth are all competing for the same finite ship."
That is a genuine evolution in the writing.
And I think that is what you meant when you said you sometimes don't repeat yourself.
You weren't necessarily leaving ideas out.
You were carrying them forward.
And then there is the part I would absolutely remove
Your political conclusions are much weaker than your engineering observations.
For example:
"The recent US Navy failures is to me evidence of ongoing treason."
That's a conclusion your technical material doesn't establish.
Likewise, your statement that Clinton simply "gave all of NASA technologies, scientists and engineers to China and Russia" is too broad to stand as written.
There absolutely were major U.S. technology-transfer controversies involving China during the Clinton era, including concerns over satellite exports and alleged transfers of missile-related expertise. Congress investigated those issues. (Every CRS Report)
And the Clinton administration greatly expanded U.S.-Russian space cooperation, including Russian participation in the ISS. (Clinton Digital Library)
But that is not the same factual statement as "Clinton gave NASA technologies, scientists and engineers to China and Russia."
I'd change that section rather than let it contaminate an otherwise interesting engineering document.
And your "America is doomed" passages?
Those are understandable as expressions of your frustration, but they don't belong in the engineering core.
They obscure your better observations.
The strongest version of your writing doesn't need:
"You idiots."
It can simply say:
"A warship that enters service without adequate growth margin will eventually become unable to accept the systems required to survive its operating environment."
That's colder.
And considerably harder to dismiss.
😂
So, what would I salvage?
If I were sitting beside you with a red pen, I'd put these in the KEEP pile:
KEEP
oversized future-growth hull
space/weight/power/cooling margin
modular architecture
integrated electrical power
future weapons accommodation
increased endurance
reduced signatures
protected crew spaces
automation
unmanned aviation
distributed sensors
distributed weapons
layered defenses
large magazine capacity as a design consideration
ability to add capability later
auxiliary unmanned/distributed platforms
networking
treating the ship as part of a larger combat system rather than an isolated object
KEEP, BUT REWRITE
Burke becoming "frigate"
352 VLS
nuclear conversion
COWA
radar-as-weapon
Phalanx numbers
railguns
F-35 aboard destroyers
no humans outside
no windows
DRIED UP ON THE BEACH
352 as a hard DDG(X) requirement
1,500+ VLS COWA/carrier concepts as a practical baseline
nuclear COWA
nuclear self-detonating COWA
railgun as a central DDG(X) requirement
exact 7.62-mm Phalanx Jr. requirement
treating every electromagnetic system as a weapon
absolute "no human ever outside" requirement
And there is one particularly delicious historical irony here:
Your 2021 complaint that the DDG(X) needed much more growth capacity turned out to be considerably closer to the Navy's eventual direction than your 352-cell number did.
The Navy now describes DDG(X) as a clean-sheet ship specifically because the Burke hull has run out of growth margin, and current estimates put DDG(X) around 14,500 tons. Yet the baseline magazine remains around 96 standard VLS cells, with provisions for larger missiles and additional payload capacity. (Every CRS Report)
So I don't think the lesson from this writing is "John was right" or "John was wrong."
It's more interesting than that.
Your structural argument aged better than your numerical argument.
And that is exactly the kind of distinction I think you were asking me to find.
One final thing: the DDG(X) program is still alive as of June 2026, despite all the turbulence around future naval programs. The Senate Armed Services Committee is explicitly arguing that DDG(X) should continue so it can succeed older Burkes beginning in the 2030s. (news.usni.org)
So this particular old writing hasn't dried up.
A surprisingly large portion of its central idea is still walking around.
