I seemed to grab a hold of the beam and traveled down it's length to it's place of origin. There was a primary LASER along power loading devices, cooling systems, control center. Ghost like images of a second and third laser seem to shimmer in and out of reality. One solid power generation unit as well as shimmering overlays of different power sources. A very solid building structure.
Then I was back in orbit for only a moment and could see every land based LASER weapons systems. There were hundreds of them. In the USA, Alaska, Hawaii, Canada, Europe, East Coast of Asia and Island dots.
The redundant power delivery systems. Not seen, but known.
The cooling system seems to be directly tied to the laser itself.
The control center was way cool. Radar maps of everything everywhere displayed at once in real time. Including zipping red U's in real time.
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Assumptions:
The shimmering aspects of these land based systems I seem to know as decisions which had not been made yet. But, the decision to build has already been made.
I could see in the planning a central nuclear plant along with one, two or three primary laser weapons. Some even had medium range missiles as well as short range guns or missiles. An effective layering of air defense. Some see it as over kill and may be a remote possibility but not a probability.
This is why I think the overlay shimmering is as it is. My assumptions are usually in error.
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Quick vision.
Snipers could attack LASER systems with their bullets of a mile or greater. They know all they need to do is damage the lens.
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31 July 2015 @ 1341 HRS.
A new one right now. I thought it was over.
An offensive missile was fired and as it was being tracked. Several new high speed targets were on intercept. The LASER acquired threats and eliminated them. Thus, guaranteeing the offensive missile a success. Within line of sight.
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The time in military weapons technology has come when shooting a bullet with a bullet can be time consuming. Especially when using a slow bullet versus a hyper fast bullet. Especially when the new hyper fast missiles have up-links/down-links and avoidance capabilities. The need for new defensive capabilities is now at the forefront. The cost effectiveness of and the continual maintenance of LASER technologies is very low. Where as maintaining the rocket fuels and conditions of weapons grade materials can be very expensive. The success with the low power naval ship Laser's can and should be up-scaled.
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31 July 2015 @ 1553:
Cone of spherical defense/offense for satellite assets. A singular cone for a singular laser.
By placing heavily powered LASER platforms in Alaska. You can control polar satellite access and egress. The laser systems can defend against any incoming threats to satellite assets. Where as no missile can even get to target in time as all you can do is just watch the destructive silence.
By then placing laser platforms in Washington, Oregon and California. The entire west coast is protected from any threats westward. Not to forget Hawaii, Japan, South Korea, Australia.
By creating a modular design into the infrastructure. You can expand the number of laser platforms as threats multiply.
By integrating similar Nuclear technologies as in Naval warships. The growing modular system can be easily built.
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31 July 2015 @ 1611:
Similar technologies used in large telescopes to clear up star observations through our dense atmosphere can be used like wise in Laser Weapons Applications.
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31 July 2015 @ 1830?Hrs.
The cone of spherical defense could hand off protective duties from one zone of responsibility to another. Thus this hand off can protect any aerial asset or even orbital asset as it travels around the planet.
For instance if a ballistic missile was launched from California into China. More than a few assets could be in the line of travel of that ballistic missile offering cones of protection for a specific amount of time and distance. With continuous tracking. Any object which was in the line of travel can then be targeted to neutralize the potential threat to the ballistic missile.
Also the buildings can all be built under false pretenses. That is until the power generators are installed, Cooling systems and power storage devices.
By building hundreds of these expandable modular buildings. The system could be online on every base or post in the world. Could this be a forth tier of ballistic missile defense?
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31 July 2015: @2148 Hrs.
A tri-LASER weapon. 3 different lasers within a single tube. Combined together to defeat a variety of adversities. With the ability to use a single LASER, two laser shot or all three LASER at once. Each kind of LASER has their own inherent strengths and weaknesses. The three LASER combined becomes a compliment.
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26 May 2016: Just had a brief vision of a new system. Where the technology lacks or lags the power capability needed to be effective. A collective LASER weapon. Where as many LASER tubes are joined together. With one in the center. A hexagon shaped laser system?
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24 June 2016:
http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/06/us-navy-admiral-says-shipboard-test-of.html
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Added on 07 Aug 2020:
The US Missile Defense network is about to level up for the benefit of western Europe. While at the same time disregarding any defense for the USA itself.
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/08/us-missile-defenses-are-about-level/167462/
Good morning, sir! ☕ The LASER hat is on. Military, science, theory, and engineering—with the assumptions separated from what physics and engineering can actually support. And I’ll stick to your request: an overall analysis for learning purposes, not a rewrite of your 2015 writing and not a judgment about where the vision came from.
My first impression is that this writing is more than a prediction about a laser weapon. It contains the beginnings of a distributed, modular, layered defense architecture: power generation, cooling, sensors, tracking, weapon systems, overlapping coverage, and the handoff of responsibility between defensive zones.
That architecture is the most interesting part to examine. Some of your ideas align with real engineering challenges; others run into substantial physical or operational limits.
1. The strongest engineering ideas in your writing
A. The laser is only one part of the weapon
You describe power generation, energy storage, cooling, control rooms, tracking, and redundant power delivery. That is exactly the right systems-engineering perspective. A laser can produce a powerful beam and still fail as a weapon if the supporting systems cannot keep it operating, aim it accurately, or manage its waste heat.
B. Sensors and weapons working together
Your real-time radar displays and tracking of multiple targets describe a networked engagement system rather than an isolated laser. Modern military systems already combine sensors, command-and-control, tracking, and weapons. The difficult part is not merely displaying everything; it is establishing reliable tracks, identifying hostile objects, deciding which threats to engage, and allocating weapons quickly enough.
C. Modular construction and redundant power
Your concept of expandable buildings with standardized systems is sensible as an architectural principle. Common modules could simplify production, maintenance, upgrades, and replacement. Redundant power delivery also makes sense—but redundancy must be genuinely independent. Two cables fed by the same failed substation are not two independent power sources.
These are not merely futuristic themes. The U.S. Navy's directed-energy programs have dealt with the integration of laser sources, surveillance, control systems, power, cooling, and maritime environmental conditions. The Navy's HELIOS system, for example, is intended for uses including countering unmanned aircraft and small boats, as well as interfering with optical sensors.
Your basic systems-engineering instinct is therefore worth studying independently of the vision itself.
2. The main scientific limitation: a laser beam through the atmosphere
Your description of a pulsing beam, with fine cloud-like strands along its path, is an interesting visual detail. But we need to distinguish the experience you described from what an observer would physically see.
A laser beam does not normally appear as a bright, solid line in clean air viewed from the side. The beam becomes visible when some of its light is scattered toward the observer by particles or other material in the atmosphere. A high-energy beam may also heat the air along its path, changing its optical properties.
The main engineering problems are these:
Absorption: Atmospheric gases absorb some of the beam's energy.
Scattering: Moisture, dust, smoke, and other particles redirect some of the light.
Turbulence: Variations in air temperature and density distort the beam's wavefront and can spread its energy.
Thermal blooming: The beam heats the air through which it passes, potentially defocusing the beam further.
Weather: Fog, rain, clouds, and other obscurants can substantially reduce performance.
These limitations become especially important over long, horizontal paths through dense lower-atmosphere air. Adaptive optics can compensate for some atmospheric distortion, but they do not make the atmosphere transparent.
That brings us to your 2015 note:
Similar technologies used in large telescopes to clear up star observations through our dense atmosphere can be used like wise in Laser Weapons Applications.
Your underlying connection is valid, with an important qualification. Astronomy uses adaptive optics to compensate for atmospheric distortion. Related techniques can improve a laser beam's focus. But telescopes do not literally clear away the atmosphere, and correcting turbulence does not eliminate absorption, scattering, or the effects of fog and clouds.
3. The power and cooling problem
You wrote that the cooling system seemed directly tied to the laser itself. That is a sound observation.
A high-energy laser converts electrical input into a beam of light, but not all the input energy becomes useful laser output. The remaining energy must be managed as heat, alongside heat from associated electronics and power-conversion equipment.
For illustration, suppose a hypothetical laser delivered 100 kW of optical power at 40% electrical-to-optical efficiency.
Illustrative engineering example—not a specification for a real weapon
Electrical input
250 kW
Laser output
100 kW
Heat from conversion
150 kW
Energy per minute
15 MJ
The 150 kW heat figure excludes additional losses from auxiliary equipment. Actual efficiency and thermal loads vary by design.
This helps explain why your imagined facility has such a substantial support structure. Cooling is not a minor accessory. It can limit how long a system fires, how soon it can fire again, and how many engagements it can sustain.
A nuclear plant could supply electricity to a laser facility, but it would not automatically solve the thermal problem. The reactor, electrical conversion equipment, cooling plant, energy storage, laser, and tracking system would all need to work together. For a real installation, the power and cooling systems would need to be sized for the intended duty cycle—not simply the laser's advertised output.
4. Could hundreds of land-based laser installations provide layered defense?
As a broad architecture, yes: multiple sites can create overlapping coverage and provide redundancy if individual sites fail. Your concept of a fourth tier of ballistic missile defense is an understandable way to frame a proposed additional defensive layer.
But the number of installations alone does not establish how much territory they can protect. Each site would be constrained by line of sight, target altitude, beam propagation, available power, tracking accuracy, engagement duration, and the characteristics of the threat.
A ground-based laser can have difficulty engaging a low-altitude target at long distance because the curvature of Earth and intervening terrain limit line of sight. A target higher in the sky may be visible for longer, but greater distance and atmospheric propagation create other challenges.
Your concept would therefore require more than placing enough sites on a map. The coverage of every installation would have to be assessed against actual target trajectories, local weather, terrain, and engagement requirements.
The Congressional Research Service has documented both the potential benefits of high-energy lasers and their limitations, including line of sight, atmospheric conditions, and the time needed to disable one target before moving to another.
5. The “cone of spherical defense” and orbital assets
This is one of the more interesting theoretical sections because it combines geometry, tracking, and coordination.
You imagine each laser providing a cone of coverage, with adjacent sites handing off responsibility as an aircraft or orbital asset moves through the network.
There are three separate concepts here:
A coverage zone: the directions and distances at which a particular site can detect and potentially engage a target.
A tracking handoff: one sensor or control system transfers a target track to another system without losing continuity.
An engagement opportunity: a weapon has the necessary line of sight, power, tracking quality, and time to achieve its assigned effect.
Your handoff concept is a reasonable systems-engineering idea. Modern networks routinely coordinate tracking and handoffs. However, handing off a track does not guarantee that the next weapon can engage the target.
The orbital component is considerably more difficult. A laser on the ground must direct its beam through the atmosphere and accurately illuminate an object moving at orbital velocity. Depending on the target and its orbit, the site may have only a limited engagement window. A ground-based installation also cannot simply control every satellite entering or leaving a polar region: orbital geometry, altitude, viewing angles, and atmospheric effects matter.
Your proposal to protect satellites with ground-based lasers is therefore a concept worth separating into a more limited and technically plausible question: Under what conditions could a ground-based laser interfere with, or damage, a particular space-based sensor? That is different from providing a reliable protective shield over a whole orbital region.
6. The offensive missile example: a critical distinction
You wrote:
An offensive missile was fired and as it was being tracked. Several new high speed targets were on intercept. The LASER acquired threats and eliminated them. Thus, guaranteeing the offensive missile a success.
This is an important change in the mission of the system.
In the earlier passages, the laser is a defensive weapon intended to protect a country or its assets. Here, it appears to protect an outgoing offensive missile by eliminating threats that could intercept it.
The underlying principle—using one system to protect another—is familiar in military operations. But it introduces several difficult questions:
How does the system distinguish a hostile interceptor from other nearby objects?
Can the laser engage the interceptor quickly enough?
Can it maintain the required beam quality while the target moves?
Can it engage multiple interceptors before the offensive missile reaches them?
What happens if the defending side uses decoys, electronic warfare, or a larger salvo?
A laser could potentially complicate an opponent's defensive engagement, but it would not guarantee the offensive missile's success. A defending force may use multiple layers of interception, alternative sensors, or more interceptors than the attacking system can defeat.
This connects directly to a limitation identified in technical assessments: an individual high-energy laser generally engages one target at a time and needs time to produce the desired effect before it can move to the next target. A sufficiently large or coordinated attack can overwhelm a finite number of weapons.
7. The sniper and the vulnerable lens
Your quick vision suggests that a sniper could damage the lens of a laser system from a mile or more away.
The basic idea is correct in one respect: optical components can be critical vulnerabilities. A laser weapon depends on optics for beam direction, focusing, and often target observation. Damage to an essential component can degrade or disable the system.
But the scenario is more complicated than simply hitting an exposed lens.
A real installation could use protected or recessed optics, shutters, sacrificial windows, redundant sensors, alternative viewing paths, and physical security. Some of these measures introduce their own limitations, but the important engineering principle is that a designer must anticipate damage to critical components.
There is also a distinction between damaging a sensor and disabling the weapon itself. If the laser has independent tracking sensors or alternate optical paths, damaging one component may not be sufficient.
Your note is useful as a reminder that the performance of a sophisticated weapon is often limited by its weakest essential subsystem—not just by the power of its main weapon.
8. Three lasers in one tube versus many tubes in a hexagonal arrangement
Your 2015 tri-laser idea and your 2016 collective-laser idea suggest two different approaches to increasing capability.
Tri-laser system
You imagined three laser systems sharing one tube, selectable individually or in combination. Different laser technologies can have different wavelengths, efficiencies, beam qualities, and operating characteristics. Combining them could be useful if each source serves a distinct purpose.
However, three beams do not automatically combine into one beam with three times the effective power. Their wavelengths, optical paths, beam quality, and target interaction would determine what combination is useful.
Collective-laser system
Your 2016 concept places multiple laser tubes around a central one in a hexagonal arrangement. This resembles a general engineering approach of combining multiple modules to increase total output or provide redundancy.
The difficult part is delivering their energy to the same target effectively. Multiple beams can be directed at the same target, but their power does not necessarily add coherently. Coherent beam combining requires tight control of phase and other optical properties; noncoherent systems can still be useful but operate differently.
The interesting principle is scaling through modules. It can make manufacturing, servicing, and expansion easier. But the system still needs a design that handles heat, optical alignment, vibration, electrical loads, and control complexity. Adding modules increases capability only if those supporting requirements are met.
9. Cost per shot: where your 2015 reasoning needs correction
You argued that laser maintenance and operating costs could be much lower than maintaining rocket fuels and weapons-grade materials.
There is a genuine economic argument here. Once installed, an electrically powered laser may have a relatively low marginal cost per engagement compared with a missile that must be manufactured, stored, transported, and replaced after use. Lasers may also have a deep magazine, provided sufficient power and cooling remain available.
But your comparison treats the cost of a laser shot too narrowly if it considers only electricity.
A fair comparison includes:
Construction and acquisition costs.
Electrical generation and distribution.
Cooling and heat rejection.
Optical components and replacement parts.
Maintenance, calibration, and personnel.
The probability of achieving the intended effect.
The cost of protecting the installation and keeping it operational.
A laser that costs relatively little to fire may still be an expensive way to defend against a target it cannot reliably engage. Conversely, against a suitable target, repeated laser engagements may offer substantial advantages over expending missiles.
The correct question is not simply, “Which weapon costs less per shot?” It is, “Which system achieves the required defensive effect at the lowest sustainable total cost?”
10. Your modular nuclear-powered platform
Your proposal to integrate technologies comparable to those used on nuclear-powered naval vessels is a logical extension of the power-and-cooling problem.
Nuclear power can provide sustained electrical generation without the same dependence on frequent fuel deliveries as conventional generators. But a naval reactor is not a ready-made plug-in power supply for a land-based laser facility. The reactor, turbines or other conversion equipment, electrical systems, cooling infrastructure, shielding, safety systems, maintenance arrangements, and licensing would need to be designed for the installation.
And there is a strategic trade-off: a large, fixed facility may be powerful and well supplied, but it is also a valuable target. Distributing many installations can improve resilience, yet it increases the burden of protecting, staffing, supplying, and maintaining them.
Your modular approach addresses the question of how to expand a system. It does not, by itself, settle whether hundreds of installations would be affordable or provide sufficient military value.
11. What the overall writing tells me about the concept
Here is my engineering assessment of the major ideas, considered separately from the question of how you experienced them.
Concept in your writing | Assessment |
|---|---|
Power generation, cooling, and redundancy | Strong systems-engineering concerns |
Networked radar, tracking, and control | Consistent with real military system design |
Modular, expandable facilities | Reasonable architectural principle |
Adaptive optics for laser weapons | Scientifically relevant, but not a cure for all atmospheric effects |
Hundreds of overlapping land-based sites | Possible as a broad network concept; effectiveness depends on coverage and mission |
Orbital protection through ground-based laser cones | Geometrically and operationally much more constrained than the writing suggests |
Multiple lasers combined into one weapon | Technically conceivable in several forms; benefits depend on optical and thermal design |
Low operating cost compared with missiles | Potential advantage, but total system cost and effectiveness matter |
A laser shield that guarantees an offensive missile's success | Not supported; an opponent can employ additional or alternative defenses |
The most significant observation
Your writing repeatedly moves beyond the weapon itself and asks how it would be integrated into a larger system. You keep returning to power, cooling, redundancy, tracking, modular construction, coverage, and coordination.
That is the thread tying the entry together.
And there is a useful distinction between the two kinds of claims in the writing:
Engineering concepts: ideas that can be evaluated through physics, mathematics, design, and testing.
Claims about future decisions or hidden installations: assertions that require independent evidence and cannot be established from the technical plausibility of the concept.
A design idea can be technically interesting without proving that it will be built, has been built, or was shown to you as a prediction.
12. My final opinion
For learning purposes, I would treat this as a rough conceptual study of a distributed, modular directed-energy defense network, written in 2015 and expanded in 2016 and 2020.
The strongest parts are the systems thinking and recognition that the weapon's supporting infrastructure is as important as its beam. The weakest parts are the assumptions that overlapping laser coverage can provide near-complete protection, that atmospheric compensation can overcome the major propagation problems, and that a defensive system can guarantee the success of an offensive missile.
Your 2016 hexagonal arrangement is also worth revisiting as a general modular-engineering concept, because it raises a question that applies far beyond lasers: When does adding more units increase useful output, and when do shared power, heat, control, and alignment constraints become the bottleneck?
That is a real engineering question with applications in energy systems, computing, communications, and industrial machinery—not just military technology.
And one final detail: your 21 October 2026 note about LASER versus laser is a small terminology correction, not a substantive engineering correction. Both uppercase and lowercase forms are used; the acronym expands to Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation.
Thank you for bringing this one in, sir. It is a good entry for examining the difference between a compelling system-level idea and the engineering work needed to make it function in the real world.
To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
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