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To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.
These are the things that are contained within my own mind. That I'm unable to verbally express. There will be all sorts of errors as I have not had the fair benefit of a proper education. If you leave a comment. Please be nice and clean. You are welcomed.
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To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.
================
To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.
==============
At the top right of my blogger page is a donate button for PayPal. If you liked this blog, were inspired from it. Please help me out with just a little something. Anything is greatly appreciated and welcomed.
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Updated.
Dream: Date Recently. Still remembered.
A narrow wooded enclosed road and a small group is walking. The small group know the evil presence is just up ahead as they continue to walk forward. The enemy up ahead who is all just like them as they are not strangers but rather deceived and disillusioned kin. They are uniformed with typical guns and much larger guns. They greatly outnumber the small group of unarmed walkers and yet they still have fear.
The opening is just up ahead and this is where the two groups shall meet. The enemy can see the small group approach and can easily see that the small group is not prepared to fight or to wage war. The commander of this military unit orders to shoot and kill them all. Then just as the first man of the small group enters the clearing in the clear of the day. As they walk through they all just disappear exactly when the order is given to fire on the helpless group. Yet all of the bullets fire which number in the thousands which have been fired touch not even the clothing of those devout Christians who just walk through the military unit who were ordered to kill them all. The military unit is now completely unaware of the group while the Christians are now fully aware and feared not as they just quietly and seamlessly walked through.
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On an open road. The military unit is ready for the small unarmed mass of devout walking Christians. Up on a distant place and unknown by either group a revolutionary militia sniper team awaits for their moment to fire their deadly shot. The military unit outnumbers the walking group of Christians more than twenty to one and they are all ready to massacre the walking Christian group. The Christian group enters the cross road where the military unit is positioned and the commander shows himself and in that moment a snipers bullet reaches the head of that military commander and he is dead and in that same moment many thousands of bullets are fired at the walking Christian walkers. While other military units which were held back begin to seek out and fire on the estimated position of the revolutionary militia sniper position. Not a single bullet touches the walking Christian as they continue to invisibly walk through the military unit who continues to fire bullets into where the devout Christians once were. While the Christians who continue to walk in faith intimately see the grimaced faces of their kin as the guns repeatedly fire into them and yet none of them is touched. The sounds of the guns were not muted. The light of fire coming out of each gun was still very bright and frightening even into their Christian faces. The gun smoke envelopes them all and they continue to smell the gun fire on them even after they cleared through.
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In the center of a darkened town. Maybe darkened by evil and hopelessness not sure. But, still dark and stark. A group of Christians enter into the small town and approach the center square. A very large military unit is already positioned with snipers on the roofs. The military unit even has hostages that they will kill and use as a bargaining chip against the Christians who are just walking through. The Christians already know that the hostages will be killed anyway just as they also will be killed. The coming bargain is just a distraction to get the walking Christians outside of the protection of what ever it is which is protecting them. The Christians continue to walk through and appear to just disappear before the military unit as they begin to kill everyone and yet blades and bullets only strike down the hostages while nothing touches the walking Christians.
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In another town, the same thing happens to this group of walking Christians. This time particular Christian men choose to walk outside of the protection of the Holy Spirit. Their hearts, minds and spirit filled with love for one another as they freely choose to save those who are about to die horrible deaths because the Christians just happen to be walking by. A devout man retrieves and saves an unlikely soul which will soon have been killed. Other devout Christian men who freely choose to leave the protection and made themselves known in order to save those who wanted to be saved were killed very quickly as were those whom they tried to save. Those devout Christians who were within the protection could see the lifeless bloodied bodies and the spirits of them who were taken into the bosom of their Lord. For their reward was immediate and those whom they tried to save and could not were already saved as their spirits were also taken. For they believed just enough to be saved as was the man on the right of Jesus was also saved because that man changed just enough.
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There will be many devout Christian groups. All manner of miracles and signs they will manifest. For they will do all of the miracles known and not known and more. The evil in the world will be in full control over every civilian on this planet. Christianity as with other religions will all be superficial with no power, no authority, no miracles. The devout Christians will be like the homeless and it is they who will show much love, peace, harmony and life. It is they who will exercise in all of the powers of the Holy Spirit. They each will be hunted, caught, tortured and killed. Just as Jesus.
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================
To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.
==============
At the top right of my blogger page is a donate button for PayPal. If you liked this blog, were inspired from it. Please help me out with just a little something. Anything is greatly appreciated and welcomed.
========================
================
To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.
==============
At the top right of my blogger page is a donate button for PayPal. If you liked this blog, were inspired from it. Please help me out with just a little something. Anything is greatly appreciated and welcomed.
========================
================
To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.
==============
At the top right of my blogger page is a donate button for PayPal. If you liked this blog, were inspired from it. Please help me out with just a little something. Anything is greatly appreciated and welcomed.
========================
================
To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.
The new written content is at the bottom and dated. I do write more when news comes out.
Do you want to lead then lead.
No apology needed, John. “American Next Generation Destroyer DDG(X): (Unedited): 07 Feb 2021” is clear now.
And I think your description of what you want is exactly the right way to approach these old writings:
If it works, I'll tell you it works.
If it is questionable, I'll tell you why.
If it is simply wrong, I'll tell you.
If it would end up “dried up on the beach,” I'll say so. 😂
I also won't penalize you for leaving things out because you didn't want to repeat yourself. If an idea appears in the Corvette, Frigate, Cruiser, Hull, or LOCE/EABO writings, I'll treat the collection as a developing body of thought, rather than demanding that every individual article contain the entire theory.
One distinction will be especially useful with this DDG(X) piece:
Your original 2021 proposal
Your later additions/revisions
What you learned from subsequent naval developments
What appears technically sound
What is speculative
What simply won't work
That way we don't accidentally judge a 2021 idea using information you couldn't have known in 2021.
And there's something else I appreciate about your phrase “dried up on the beach.” 😄 It gives us a very simple engineering test:
Does this idea survive contact with reality?
If not, we'll put it on the beach and leave it there.
I'll use the DDG(X) material as the next major piece in the sequence and compare it with the earlier naval writings you've shared.
Yes, John. Now I see what you were trying to show me. You weren't asking me merely to fact-check the February 2021 DDG(X) piece. You were asking me to read it as one point in the evolution of your naval thinking, including the older writings you deliberately didn't repeat, and then tell you which ideas have survived that evolution and which ones have effectively dried up on the beach.
I went back through the historical material you linked and checked the DDG(X) program against more recent congressional and Navy material. And there is something rather interesting here.
Your 2021 DDG(X) writing is much better than I would have judged it if I read it in isolation.
Not because all the specifications are right. A lot aren't.
Rather, the underlying engineering philosophy is remarkably consistent with where the actual DDG(X) program eventually went.
In particular, you kept returning to:
hull growth margin
electrical power
cooling
future weapons
space/weight reserve
modularity
unmanned systems
survivability
reduced signatures
larger sensors
increased endurance
not designing a ship that is already obsolete when commissioned
Those are not crazy ideas. In fact, the Navy's own DDG(X) description now emphasizes greater space, weight, electrical power and cooling capacity specifically so the ship can accept future weapons and sensors. (Congress.gov)
And this is the part that really caught my attention:
"The hull must be engineered with the mindset that no humans will be outside of the ship for any kind of activity."
Your wording is extreme, but the underlying idea is much stronger than it first appears. Your older writings repeatedly moved toward automation, distributed sensors, unmanned systems and keeping sailors protected inside the hull. That's a continuing thread, not something you invented in this particular DDG(X) article.
Your 2019 warfare writing explicitly evolved from merely counting ships and missiles toward asking what those weapons can actually do, how they interact, and how much capability one platform can deliver. (John MacKechnie)
That's important because your own 2019 writing actually contains the correction to your later 352-VLS argument.
You wrote:
"Anyone can count missile cells. But, what can those missiles do..."
That is one of the strongest sentences in the whole collection.
And I think we need to keep it.
This is probably the strongest part of your DDG(X) concept.
You argued in 2021 that the hull should be deliberately oversized so that weapons, power generation, cooling and other systems could be changed throughout the ship's life.
That is remarkably close to the official DDG(X) rationale.
CRS says the Navy wants DDG(X) to have more growth margin than Flight III Burke specifically in space, weight, electrical power and cooling. (Congress.gov)
And the current estimate is around 14,500 tons, roughly 50% more displacement than a Burke. (Every CRS Report)
So your fundamental statement:
Don't build tomorrow's warship around today's equipment. Build the hull around tomorrow's unknown equipment.
That survived very well.
This is another one where your old writing aged surprisingly well.
You wanted the hull engineered around future nuclear, conventional and hybrid power arrangements.
I would not keep your nuclear-specific implementation as written, but the obsession with electrical power absolutely survives.
Congress required testing of DDG(X) propulsion systems capable of providing at least 40 MW of reserve power beyond propulsion and ship-service requirements at patrol speed. (GovInfo)
And the Navy has explicitly identified electrical generation as one of the central DDG(X) design problems because of future weapons, sensors and directed-energy systems. (TWZ)
So your basic intuition was right:
Power isn't merely propulsion anymore. Power becomes a weapons-and-sensors resource.
That's a very important distinction.
This is one of those things ordinary people don't think about.
You repeatedly included cooling alongside engines and generators.
That's good engineering thinking.
CRS literally includes cooling capacity in the DDG(X)'s future growth margin. (Congress.gov)
So I would not remove that from your historical argument.
You wrote that the Burke hull should eventually be regarded as a smaller class because its ability to absorb future systems was becoming constrained.
I would soften your classification argument, but retain your engineering argument.
The Navy's own reasoning now says the DDG-51 hull form does not provide sufficient space and center-of-gravity margin for future capabilities after decades of upgrades. (Every CRS Report)
And the Navy is still building Burkes. The final Flight IIA Burke, DDG-127, was accepted in May 2026, while Flight III ships continue into the fleet. (U.S. Navy)
So:
"Burke is a frigate" — that's your provocative classification.
"Burke is approaching its growth limits" — that's the defensible engineering argument.
Those are two different statements.
I'd preserve the second.
This is another one I don't want to throw away.
You wrote that the hull should be designed around future installation/removal of machinery and capabilities.
The actual DDG(X) concept developed a Destroyer Payload Module, essentially a future hull-growth provision that could add capability later. CRS describes it as a possible additional mid-body hull section providing additional payload capacity. (Congress.gov)
The Navy's own 2022 concept presentation described the DPM as an option for future growth. (NAVSEA)
That's pretty darn close to the philosophy you were expressing.
Not the same engineering solution.
But the same problem.
This may be one of the biggest things in the entire document.
You repeatedly worried about large numbers of cheap unmanned threats overwhelming expensive defensive weapons.
And you were talking about that before the current naval drone problem became impossible to ignore.
By 2025, Navy officials were explicitly talking about DDG(X) in terms of the problem posed by swarming drones and asking whether the future ship needs a large-bore gun, directed-energy weapon, or both. (Defense One)
So I would definitely retain your basic observation:
A warship designed only around defeating a handful of exquisite threats can be overwhelmed by a large number of inexpensive threats.
That's a useful observation.
There are several things in this document I would put firmly in the dried-up-on-the-beach category.
This is the biggest one.
I understand exactly where you got there.
You had developed the idea from your older writings that missile-cell quantity was the modern equivalent of counting guns.
Your 2019 writing makes that argument very clearly. (John MacKechnie)
And I understand the logic.
But 352 VLS cells on one DDG(X)-type surface combatant is where your numerical framework overwhelms the engineering framework.
The actual DDG(X) baseline remains centered around 96 standard VLS cells, with an option to substitute 12 larger missile cells for 32 of those standard cells, plus two 21-cell RAM launchers. (Congress.gov)
That doesn't prove 96 is optimal.
But it does demonstrate something important about your own thinking:
You were right that magazine depth mattered. You were probably wrong to turn one particular magazine number into the governing requirement.
And your 2019 writing already warned against doing precisely that.
You said:
"Anyone can count missile cells."
There is your answer.
😂
I would keep the magazine-depth argument and remove the hard 352 requirement from the core design.
This one is fascinating.
I would not throw COWA away.
But I would throw away several pieces of the original COWA concept.
Your older writing shows that COWA evolved from the idea of taking an otherwise limited platform and turning it into a distributed "spoke" of a larger force. Your 2015 writing literally describes the LCS becoming spokes around an umbrella/wheel rather than trying to make every individual ship do everything. (John MacKechnie)
And your 2019 writing describes COWA as a way of extending missile/sensor capacity beyond the principal ship. (John MacKechnie)
That conceptual idea is still alive.
But:
"COWA with 352 VLS"
No.
"COWA containing a nuclear reactor"
Probably no.
"COWA self-detonating with a nuclear weapon"
That's where the idea leaves useful naval architecture and becomes something I would remove from the writing.
The more interesting version of COWA is simply:
A remotely operated or optionally autonomous auxiliary naval platform that extends sensors, communications, logistics, aviation, decoys or weapons away from the crewed combatant.
That's actually a useful conceptual category.
And it fits beautifully with your old "spokes of a wheel" thinking.
I'd mark this "interesting but not presently justified."
Not stupid.
Not impossible in the abstract.
But the argument isn't established sufficiently in your writing.
The current DDG(X) program is pursuing integrated electrical power, not nuclear propulsion. The actual engineering problem is already enormous without introducing nuclear propulsion into the design. (TWZ)
Your stronger argument is:
Design the ship so future propulsion/power technology doesn't require throwing away the hull.
That's better than:
Design this destroyer around a future nuclear conversion.
The first is future-proofing.
The second becomes a very large engineering requirement of its own.
This is another one I'd dry out.
You wrote that the destroyer should be able to contain and service F-35s.
The aviation concept is good.
The F-35 requirement isn't.
A large surface combatant having aviation capability is useful. Helicopters and unmanned aircraft make enormous sense.
But making the DDG(X) effectively into a miniature aircraft carrier creates enormous consequences in:
hangar volume
aviation fuel
maintenance
weapons storage
crew
deck operations
stability
survivability
mission tradeoffs
The actual DDG(X) concept does have increased aviation facilities/hangar capability, but that isn't the same thing as making it an F-35 carrier. The 2022 Navy concept specifically emphasized increased hangar size and unmanned-aircraft control. (NAVSEA)
So:
aviation capability — keep.
F-35 as a routine DDG(X) requirement — remove.
This one is almost certainly dried up on the beach.
Not because electromagnetic launchers are physically nonsensical.
But because your writing treats railgun as though the remaining problem is principally engineering.
The program history suggests the problem was much larger than that.
I'd preserve your observation that future weapons may impose enormous electrical and thermal loads.
But I would stop making railgun a central DDG(X) requirement.
Interestingly, that actually strengthens your argument about power architecture.
The ship doesn't need to know whether tomorrow's weapon is a railgun, laser, microwave system, or something we haven't invented.
It needs enough power, cooling, space and structural margin to accept whatever replaces today's weapon.
That's your better idea.
There is a useful idea hiding inside this.
High-power electromagnetic systems can have effects beyond simply detecting targets.
But your description becomes too broad when it treats the radar system itself as a generalized directed-energy weapon.
I'd rewrite the underlying concept as:
Electromagnetic warfare and sensing should be architected together rather than treated as completely separate systems.
That survives.
This is another place where the principle survives but the number doesn't.
Your instinct was:
don't have one last-ditch defensive system doing everything.
Correct.
Your proposed exact number isn't something the writing establishes.
And modern naval defense is increasingly layered: missiles, electronic warfare, decoys, guns, directed energy and other systems.
So I'd retain:
multiple independent defensive layers with overlapping engagement capabilities.
I'd remove the fixation on four Phalanxes.
This is an interesting thought experiment.
But I'd mark it "conceptual, not established."
The problem isn't whether you can build an automated gun.
You obviously can.
The problem is whether the ammunition expenditure, sensors, engagement geometry, maintenance and probability of kill justify that particular caliber and architecture.
Your larger idea — a low-cost defensive layer against low-cost threats — is much more valuable than the 7.62 specification.
I'd keep the principle but soften the absolute.
A modern warship cannot realistically be designed on the assumption that humans will never go outside.
But you were really describing something else:
Human exposure should be minimized because the external environment is increasingly hostile to both people and electronics.
That's a very different and much stronger statement.
Keep that.
I'd keep it as a design consideration, not a universal law.
The trend toward integrated sensors and protected command spaces is reasonable.
But windows aren't merely decorative holes in the hull. They have operational consequences, emergency implications and human-factors considerations.
So I'd say:
Minimize exposed conventional bridge architecture and maximize protected sensor-fed situational awareness.
That's much stronger.
Your 2019 material actually contains a more mature version of your 2021 thinking.
You wrote:
"This must be beyond missile cell counts."
That sentence is important.
Because the progression of your writings appears to have been:
2012:
"Ships need more guns."
↓
2015:
"Distribute capability among ships."
↓
2017:
"Ship classes need more capability and growth."
↓
2019:
"Count weapons, but don't merely count weapons."
↓
2021:
"Build the hull around future capability."
↓
2022–23:
"Power, sensors, unmanned systems, directed energy and magazine depth are all competing for the same finite ship."
That is a genuine evolution in the writing.
And I think that is what you meant when you said you sometimes don't repeat yourself.
You weren't necessarily leaving ideas out.
You were carrying them forward.
Your political conclusions are much weaker than your engineering observations.
For example:
"The recent US Navy failures is to me evidence of ongoing treason."
That's a conclusion your technical material doesn't establish.
Likewise, your statement that Clinton simply "gave all of NASA technologies, scientists and engineers to China and Russia" is too broad to stand as written.
There absolutely were major U.S. technology-transfer controversies involving China during the Clinton era, including concerns over satellite exports and alleged transfers of missile-related expertise. Congress investigated those issues. (Every CRS Report)
And the Clinton administration greatly expanded U.S.-Russian space cooperation, including Russian participation in the ISS. (Clinton Digital Library)
But that is not the same factual statement as "Clinton gave NASA technologies, scientists and engineers to China and Russia."
I'd change that section rather than let it contaminate an otherwise interesting engineering document.
Those are understandable as expressions of your frustration, but they don't belong in the engineering core.
They obscure your better observations.
The strongest version of your writing doesn't need:
"You idiots."
It can simply say:
"A warship that enters service without adequate growth margin will eventually become unable to accept the systems required to survive its operating environment."
That's colder.
And considerably harder to dismiss.
😂
If I were sitting beside you with a red pen, I'd put these in the KEEP pile:
KEEP
oversized future-growth hull
space/weight/power/cooling margin
modular architecture
integrated electrical power
future weapons accommodation
increased endurance
reduced signatures
protected crew spaces
automation
unmanned aviation
distributed sensors
distributed weapons
layered defenses
large magazine capacity as a design consideration
ability to add capability later
auxiliary unmanned/distributed platforms
networking
treating the ship as part of a larger combat system rather than an isolated object
KEEP, BUT REWRITE
Burke becoming "frigate"
352 VLS
nuclear conversion
COWA
radar-as-weapon
Phalanx numbers
railguns
F-35 aboard destroyers
no humans outside
no windows
DRIED UP ON THE BEACH
352 as a hard DDG(X) requirement
1,500+ VLS COWA/carrier concepts as a practical baseline
nuclear COWA
nuclear self-detonating COWA
railgun as a central DDG(X) requirement
exact 7.62-mm Phalanx Jr. requirement
treating every electromagnetic system as a weapon
absolute "no human ever outside" requirement
And there is one particularly delicious historical irony here:
Your 2021 complaint that the DDG(X) needed much more growth capacity turned out to be considerably closer to the Navy's eventual direction than your 352-cell number did.
The Navy now describes DDG(X) as a clean-sheet ship specifically because the Burke hull has run out of growth margin, and current estimates put DDG(X) around 14,500 tons. Yet the baseline magazine remains around 96 standard VLS cells, with provisions for larger missiles and additional payload capacity. (Every CRS Report)
So I don't think the lesson from this writing is "John was right" or "John was wrong."
It's more interesting than that.
Your structural argument aged better than your numerical argument.
And that is exactly the kind of distinction I think you were asking me to find.
One final thing: the DDG(X) program is still alive as of June 2026, despite all the turbulence around future naval programs. The Senate Armed Services Committee is explicitly arguing that DDG(X) should continue so it can succeed older Burkes beginning in the 2030s. (news.usni.org)
So this particular old writing hasn't dried up.
A surprisingly large portion of its central idea is still walking around.
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To avert all of the coming bad and sad prophecies. We each must decide to do the following everyday, every hour, every minute and every second.
All without any pride, ego, arrogance, supremacy and entitlements.